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Cert to CA6 (Martin, 
Jones, Wellford) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petrs argue: (1} CA6 erred in holding that "no 
corporate development" statements were materially false · and mis-
leadi g; and (2} CA6 erred in affirming the de's certification of 
intiff class based on a presumption of reliance. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petrs are Basic, Inc. and 
of its officers and directors. Resps represent a class -
of shareholders of Basic who sold Basic common stock between Oc-
IX:.-N lA - leghe lj\Q. ~v1-2511fl1 Issue_ fs 11\A..fovr~ · 
:&>r wJ~ 25\'S ~ 'fU- CA :s h 6rtQ.l!t f e lei I ~ 
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tober 21, 1977, and December 15, 1978. Beginning in September 
1976, James Kelly, an officer in Combustion Engineering, Inc., 
began negotiations with officers of Basic regarding a possible 
merger/acquisition. Both company's stock was traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Negotiations continued through the 
end of 1976 and through 1977 and 1978. On October 18, 1977, 
Basic's management met with its investment bankers to discuss 
preparation of a valuation of Basic to use in the merger negotia-
tions. On October 19 and 20, 1977, the trading volume of Basic 
on the NYSE increased from an average of 6, 000 to 8, 000 shares 
!1'7 7 
per day to 29,000 shares per day. On October 21, Basic issued, 
-1 
through petr Muller, its president, the first of five public an-
nouncements that form the basis of resps' action. Petr Muller 
denied that any negotiations were being conducted with respect to 
a possible merger.l 
During the early part of July 1978, Muller and Kelly agreed 
that Kelly would prepare an informal offer for Basic, and Combus-
tion directed its investment bankers to prepare analyses of ac-
quisi tion prices. On July 14, the price of Basic's stock rose 
over 3 points on a trading volume of approximately 18,200 shares. 
lThe announcement, 
Dealer, stated: 
published in The Cleveland Plain 
~~--~--~~~--~~--
.• 
"President Max Muller said the company knew 
no reason for the stock's activity and that no 
negotiations were under way with any company for 
a merger. He said Flintkote recently denied Wall 
Street rumors that it would make a tender offer 
of $25 a share for control of [Basic]." 
-3-
A NYSE officer asked a representative of Basic about the unusual 
activity in Basic stock and Basic again denied that there were 
any undisclosed merger or acquisition plans or other significant 
corporate developments. 
On September 14, Combustion directed its investment bankers 
to prepare and deliver to Kelly a draft proposal letter for the 
acquisition of Basic. On September 25-26, the price of Basic 
stock increased a total of almost 5 points on a daily volume of 
over 28,000 shares per day. A NYSE officer again contacted Basic 
and inquired whether there were any undisclosed merger or acqui-
sition plans, any developments relating to a possible tender 
offer, or any other corporate developments. Basic stated there 
were no such developments. Basic's president, Muller, when ap-
----, 
pr ised of the NYSE' s inquiries, issued a press release denying 
the existence of any merger/acquisition negotiations.2 
The contacts between the two companies continued. During 
the first week of November, Basic denied, for the fourth time, 
that there were any developments that would account for the in-
creased activity in its stock.3 On November 27, Kelly met with 
2The release stated: 
"[M] anagement is unaware of any present or 
pending corporate development that would result 
in the abnormally heavy trading activity and 
price fluctuation in company shares that have 
been experienced in the past few days." 
3This denial was contained in Basic's "Nine Month Interim 
Report to Shareholders." This report stated: 
"With regard to the stock market activity in 
the Company's shares we remain unaware of any 




Muller and others from Basic and discussed an all cash price of 
$35 per share, which Basic rejected. Negotiations continued dur-
ing the next two weeks, culminating on December 14, 1978 with 
Combustion's executive commit tee approving a tender offer for 
Basic at $46 per share. On December 15, Basic's stock price in-
creased dramatically and, for a fifth time, Basic denied the ex-
istence of any corporate developments when queried by the NYSE. 
Basic requested that the NYSE suspend trading its shares on De-
cember 18, and on December 19, Basic accepted Combustion's offer. 
Resps filed an action in de alleging that petrs' various 
- -------. 
statements denying the existence of merger discussions were false - ·--- ------, 
and misleading in violation of sect ion 10 (b) of the Securities 
~------------~
Exchange Act of 19 3 4 and Rule 1 Ob- 5. Re sps claimed they sus-
tained substantial losses because they relied on petrs' state-
ments and s~their shares of Basic stock at an artificially low 
price. The de (ED Ohio, Thomas [sdj]) certified a class consist-
ing of all parties who so1d Basic stock during the merger negoti-
ations' time period, applying a presumption that these parties 
relied petrs' Following discovery, 
~ 
upon statements. the de 
granted petrs' motion for summary judgment after finding that the 
statements, as a matter of law, were not material and that the 
petrs did not act with scienter. 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
account for the high volume of trading and price 




On cross-appeals to CA6, the court reversed the award of SJ, 
1\ 
affirmed the class certification, and remanded to the de for fur-______ _______, 
ther proceedings. CA6 noted that it need not address whether 
petrs had an initial affirmative duty to disclose the contacts 
and negotiations with Combustion. If a corporation is not under 
a duty to disclose certain information, but voluntarily makes a 
statement " 1 calculated to influence the investing public 1 the 
corporation then has a duty to disclose sufficient information so 
that the statement made is not 1 false or misleading or so 
incomplete as to mislead. 1 " Petn App lOa {quoting SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 {CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 
u.s. 976 {1969)). Petrs 1 duty to clarify and disclose the merger 
discussions arose only because of petrs 1 statements denying 
knowledge of "present or pending corporate developments." The 
petrs had a duty to be truthful and the record clearly shows that 
the denials were misleading, if not completely false. CA6 relied 
on First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (CAS 
1977), cert. denied, 435 u.s. 952 (1978): Under Rule lOb-S, "[a] 
duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes 
to say anything." 
CA6 determined that the facts petrs neglected to disclose 
were material. Applying the test of materiality articulated in 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 u.s. 438 (1976), CA6 
concluded that the reasonable investor, having been informed that 
petrs were aware of no corporate developments that would cause 
the increased activity in Basic stock on the NYSE, would have 
thought that the disclosure of the merger negotiations "signifi-
'. ' . 
~ I 
-6-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 
"When a company whose stock is publicly traded makes a statement, 
as Basic did, that "no negotiations' are underway, and that the 
corporation knows o f 'no reason for the stock's activity' 
information concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes 
material by virtue of the statement denying their existence." 
Petn App 13a (emphasis in original). 
CA6 acknowledged its disposition of the rna ter ial i ty issue 
.....__ --
conflicted with CA3's decision in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 
742 F.2d 751 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 105 s.ct. 1189 (1985). On 
similar facts , vCA3 held that a company, which was involved in 
merger negotiations, did not make a false or misleading statement 
when it disclosed that it was unaware of any reason for the un-
usual activity in its stock. CA3 reasoned that the company's 
mangagement "clearly knew of information that might have account-
ed for the increase in trading," id., at 759, but held that the 
statement was not misleading because the merger discussions were ~ 
not material, and failure to disclose them could not, therefore, 
. 
be an omission of material fact. 
As to the class certification issue, the court, noting that 
reliance is an essential element of a lOb-S action that estab-
lishes the causal nexus between the defendant's misconduct and 
the plaintiff's injury, endorsed the de's application of a pre-
sumption of reliance. Without such a presumption, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
23 (b) (3) 's requirement that members of a putative class share 
~ questions of law or fact in common that predominate over ques-
... 
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tions affecting only individual members. CA6 noted that courts 
have applied a presumption of reliance in cases that involve ma-
terial misrepresentations that distort the price of stock on the 
impersonal market--the so-called "fraud on the market theory." 
The theory has been consistently applied in this context. See, 
e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (CAll 1984), cert. 
denied, 105 S.Ct. 814 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort 
Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority, 717 F.2d 1330 (CAlO 
1983), cert. denied, 465 u.s. 1026 (1984). The presumption is 
triggered by proving five elements: ( 1) the defendants made pub-
lic misrepresentations; (2) the misrepresentations were material; 
(3) the stock was traded on an efficient market; (4) the misrep-
resentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to mis-
judge the value of the stock; and (5) the plaintiff traded in the 
stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and the 
time the truth was revealed. CA6 determined resps established 
the threshold facts for proving their losses. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that cert should be granted to 
resolve the conflict with Greenfield. The financial community 
needs a clear rule governing a company's obligation to disclose 
preliminary contacts regarding a possible merger when unusual 
trading activity occurs. CA6's decision that a "no corporate 
developments" statement is a material omission when merger dis-
cussions are occurring, even if the discussions might not have 
been material in the absence of the denial, improperly collapses 
the "materiality" requirement into the "false and misleading" 
requirement. The proper approach is to analyze whether the merg-
-8-
er negotiations, at the time of the statement, had progressed to 
the point that it was likely that the merger would occur. CA6 
failed to apply properly the materia l ity test of TSC Industries. 
Under this test, both CA2 and CA3 have held that failure to dis-
close preliminary merger contacts is not a material omission. 
Here, by creating a standard that deems material any information 
relating to preliminary merger contacts, CA6 ignores the plain 
language of TSC Industries: information is material only if there 
is "a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, 
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder." 426 u.s., at 449. 
Petrs contend that the use of a presumption of reliance in 
class certifications presents an important issue that this Court 
should address. Courts that permit such use of presumed reliance 
generally cite as authority Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 u.s. 128 (1972). But that case didn't involve class 
certifications, and, in any event, it merely stands for the prop-
osition that in cases of material nondisclosures reliance may be 
presumed. That proposition is inapplicable to the situation here 
that involves an allegation of misleading disclosures. Further-
more, a presumption of reliance should not be applied to resps 
who were sellers, not buyers, of securities. Decisions to sell 
are likely to be highly individualized and rpay not necessarily 
depend heavily on the market price of the stock. It is unreason-
able to assume here that class members sold their stock in reli-
ance upon petrs' "no corporate development" statements. 
-9-
Resps contend that the materiality inquiry involves a fact-
specific analysis that does not merit plenary review by this 
Court. Contrary to petrs' assertions, CA6 did not establish a 
per se rule that all preliminary merger contacts are material. 
CA6 merely decided, in explicit reliance on TSC Industries, that 
on the facts of this case, petrs' false and misleading statements 
were material as a matter of law. 
CA6' s decision does not directly conf 1 ict with Greenfield. 
It is true, resps argue, that the Greenfield majority employed an 
unreasonably narrow reading of the company's "no corporate devel-
opment" statement that disregarded the meaning a reasonable in-
vestor would attach to the statement. The critical point, howev-
er, is that Greenfield held only that the statement was not false 
or misleading, not that it was immaterial. Hence, there is no 
direct conflict. 
Resps note that the SEC, 
opposed the de's holding that 
appearing as amicus curiae below, 
false and misleading statements 
about merger discussions do not become material until an agree-
ment in principle between the parties is reasonably certain. See 
also In re Carnation Co., Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 22214, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,183,801 (July 8, 1985) (" [A]n issuer statement 
that there is no corporate development that would account for 
unusual market activity in its stock, made while the issuer is 
engaged in acquisition discussions, may be materially false and 
misleading."). 
As to the presumption of reliance, resps point out that 6 
circuits have now approved its use in securities fraud actions. 
-10-
Resp Opp. 26 (citing cases). There is no legal authority for 
petrs' argument that the fraud on the market theory is inappli-
cable to sellers of securities. It is clear that material public 
rni srepresen tat ions can cause a deflation of stock prices in an 
efficient market, thereby harming those that sell. 
4. DISCUSSION: 1. This decision conflicts with Greenfield. 
It is true that in a technical sense the holding in Greenfield 
can be construed narrowly to be only that the statement involved 
there was not false, inaccurate, or misleading. Viewed as such, 
one can argue, as resps do, that the is sue of rna ter i ali ty was 
never reached by the Greenfield court. I find this argument un-
persuasive as it overlooks the underlying premise of Greenfield's 
~because the merger agreement had not been sufficiently ( 
finalized, the discussions relating to a possible merger were not 
material and the company therefore had no duty to disclose them. 
CA3 thus implicitly rejected the rationale of CA6 here: the duty 
to disclose information 'about the merger discussions arose not 
because the information itself was material, but because the corn-
pany voluntarily chose to disclose some information related to 
the negotiations. 
2. Resps are correct in arguing that CA6 did not adopt a~ 
se rule that all pre-merger contacts are material. CA6 analyzed 
the petrs' statements with specific reference to the materiality 
standards set forth in TSC Industries. 
3. There are no inter-circuit conflicts with respect to the 
presumption of reliance issue. Petrs' argument that for purposes 
of class certification, reliance shouldn't be presumed in cases 
-11-
involving allegations of false or misleading statements doesn't 
seem particularly persuasive. In any event, this case can easily 
be viewed as a failure to disclose case, in which the rationale 
of Affiliated Ute applies with full force. 
4. The materiality issue is an important one that will un-
->---
doubtedly recur. Resps assert that the SEC has taken the posi-
tion that Greenfield was wrongly decided, and language from In re 
Carnation, supra, suggests resps are correct. For these reasons, 
in addition to the conflict with CA3, I recommend that the Court 
~ 
5. RECOMMENDATION: CVSG 
There is a response. 
September 29, 1986 Burcham Opin in petn. 
,, . 
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